Protestants and Catholics: Similar work ethic, different social ethic by Benito Arruñada
  1
Benito Arruñada∗ 
Protestants and Catholics:  
Similar Work Ethic, Different Social Ethic** 
The Economic Journal, 2010, 120 (547), 890-918. 
Abstract 
This article develops two hypotheses about economically-relevant values of Christian 
believers, according to which Protestants should work more and more effectively, as in the 
“work ethic” argument of Max Weber, or display a stronger “social ethic” that would lead them 
to monitor each other’s conduct, support political and legal institutions and hold more 
homogeneous values. Tests using current survey data confirm substantial partial correlations and 
possible different “effects” in mutual social control, institutional performance and homogeneity 
of values but no difference in work ethics. Protestantism therefore seems conducive to capitalist 
economic development, not by the direct psychological route of the Weberian work ethic but 
rather by promoting an alternative social ethic that facilitates impersonal trade.  
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This article compares the economically-relevant values of Catholics and Protestants based on 
predictions that stem from differences in the theology, church organization and social practice of 
the two religions. In particular, it argues that different behaviours and values between 
Catholicism and Protestantism fit in with differences in beliefs and in the enforcement 
mechanisms that have characterized these two religions since the Reformation. Catholicism 
relied on the theology of salvation by works and the role of the Church as intermediary and 
enforcement agent. Protestantism, on the other hand, relied on salvation by divine grace and 
enforcement through social interactions. Both differences affected a number of factors that 
impinge on individual success and how institutions and the economy work. In particular, while 
Protestantism favours the emergence of anonymous trade and thus markets, Catholicism is more 
conducive to developing personalized trade. From this line of reasoning two hypotheses—
according to which the two  religions produced different work and social ethics—and a number 
of specific predictions are drawn and then tested on data from the 1998 ISSP survey, which 
covers 32 countries, thus making it possible to account for country fixed effects and to purge the 
effects of religion from country-level unobserved heterogeneity.  
Numerous empirical studies have been carried out on the economic effects of religion 
(Iannaccone, 1998). Within the sociology and economics of religion, most works focus on real 
variables, trying to explain the relationship between religious traits such as affiliation or 
participation and diverse measures of behaviour and achievement at the individual level. 
Connections have been found, among others, between religiosity and wages (Chiswick, 1983), 
school attendance (Freeman, 1986), health (Ellison, 1991), and criminal behaviour (Evans et al., 
1995). However, it is understandably hard to draw general conclusions from individual 
observations within a single country. Cross-country studies have also found connections between 
religious characteristics or country background and a variety of country-level economic 
characteristics, such as values assumed to be conducive to capitalist development, as well as 
historical or recent economic performance. Thus, La Porta et al. (1997) and Inglehart (1999) find 
that trust is lower in Catholic countries; Blum and Dudley (2001) estimate that wages increased 
more in Protestant European cities between 1500 and 1750; Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue 
that predominantly Catholic countries tend to offer less protection to lenders because of an 
alleged Catholic bias against usury; Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006) show that growth relates 
positively to beliefs and negatively to church attendance, suggesting that the effect of religion 
depends on efficiency in the production of belief; Inglehart and Norris (2004) confirm that the 
authority of established religions tends to decrease in wealthy countries. However, studies that 
use country measurements and averages within a cross-section of countries find it difficult to 
identify the effects of religion as it is mixed up with other institutional factors. 
The methodology of this article is similar to that used by Glaeser and Glendon (1998), 
Sacerdote and Glaeser (2008), and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) in relying on an 
international collection of survey data at the individual level and controlling for fixed country 
effects, as well as several personal characteristics. This within-country analysis, by controlling 
for most potential causes, comes closer to identifying the effects of religion. In fact, with the 
inclusion of country controls, the effect of religion might be underestimated to the extent that it 
has become embedded in national traits.  
Overall, its findings provide little support for Weber’s “work ethic” hypothesis, whereby 
Protestants tend to work more and more effectively than Catholics. They support, however, a 
“social ethic” hypothesis, as Protestant values shape individuals to be more active in mutual   3
social control, more supportive of institutions, less bound to close circles of family and friends 
and to hold more homogeneous values. 
These results are in line with Glaeser and Glendon (1998) who, after modelling the incentives 
in Calvinist predestination, confirm empirically that Catholicism and Protestantism associate 
with different social interactions; and with Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), who also find 
that Catholicism and Protestantism offer pros and cons with respect to economic attitudes. The 
argument is partly similar to that of Becker and Woessmann (2009), who argue that Protestant 
regions grew faster because Protestant emphasis on reading the Bible led, as a side effect, to 
greater investment in literacy and human capital. My argument is also one of side effects but 
related to the development of a social ethic that favoured market transactions and market-
enhancing institutions.1 
The present work differs from, and complements, previous works in several important ways. 
First, some previous works supply heterogeneous empirical correlations between religion and 
economic performance or attitudes. As a consequence, their findings are hard to evaluate 
whereas the empirical tests in this article are developed from an analytical framework that allows 
a set of testable hypotheses to be drawn up, painting a more systematic and theoretical picture of 
the links between alleged causes and effects, which comes closer to examining cultural 
innovation instead of taking culture as given. Second, the effect of religion is estimated not only 
on values but also on personal outcomes such as working hours, education and personal success. 
Third, using data from the 1998 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys 
conducted in 1998 and 1999 in 32 countries allows estimation of the effects of religion when 
strong believers allegedly played a greater role in society.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 1 develops a framework to analyze the 
economic impact of religions, based on a typology of enforcement systems, applies it to the 
changes introduced by the Protestant Reformation and defines on this basis two testable 
hypotheses according to which Protestantism favours a more productive work ethic or a stronger 
social ethic that leads Protestants to exert greater social control, support the rule of law more and 
hold more homogeneous values. Section 2 describes the ISSP data, the specific variables 
employed and the statistical regressions used to test the hypotheses. Section 3 presents and 
discusses the results, according to which Protestantism promotes values favourable to capitalist 
relations based on impersonal trade, with no perceptible impact on the work ethic. Section 4 
concludes. 
                                                 
1 Ekelund et al. (2006: 189-231) discuss other possible reasons, such as simpler churches and 
liturgies, and fewer holidays and pilgrimages, as to why the Protestant Reformation may have 
affected economic growth.    4
1. Analytical Framework 
1.1. The Effect of Religion on Enforcement and Growth 
In all societies, individual behaviour is constrained by norms and rules that humans define 
and enforce by different means. Religion is one of these means. To analyze the effects of 
Christian religions, I will distinguish three types of structures according to which party is 
responsible for enforcing the more or less implicit terms of exchange in a given interaction. 
Under “first party” enforcement, the obliged individuals evaluate their own conduct in relation to 
their own reading of a moral code, a code that includes many economically-relevant preferences, 
towards effort, thriftiness, and so on. In accordance with this evaluation, individuals sanction 
themselves with some psychological compensation, which in Christianity is related to the idea of 
“salvation” and eternal life in heaven. “Second party” enforcement is based on verification and 
sanction by the party suffering the consequences of breach. In addition to partners in a standard 
economic exchange, peers in groups are also second parties to the extent that they exert pressure 
on noncompliant members through diverse means, from shaming to ostracizing or even killing 
them. Lastly, under “third party” enforcement, more or less specialized agents, such as political 
rulers, judges and police forces, verify the behaviour of group members and punish those who do 
not follow the rules.   
Religion obviously influences first party enforcement. For example, relative to the more 
individualistic pagan views prevalent at the time of the Roman empire, Christianity greatly 
reinforced first party enforcement by imposing on believers the then novel moral duty of helping 
their neighbours (Stark, 1996). In this Christian spirit, natural feelings of compassion, which 
Roman patricians were educated to suppress, were the cornerstone of Adam Smith’s moral 
conception in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). Less obviously, religion also affects the 
functioning of second and third party enforcement. In primitive societies, there is even little 
separation between religious and civil law. In more developed theocratic regimes, religious 
authorities also take over or dominate political rulers, and there is little or no separation between 
religious and civil law. Christianity followed a long and tortuous path along these lines. It started 
as a minority cult whose views conflicted with those that were politically correct at the time, but 
became the State religion in the last centuries of the Roman empire. During the late Middle 
Ages, and especially on the eve of the Reformation, the Church was not only the monopoly 
supplier of religious services but also the main provider of educational, legal, bureaucratic and 
welfare services; it commanded substantial military forces; the papal state constituted a political 
power in itself; and churchmen were the main political officials all across Europe (Cameron, 
1991).  
1.2. Comparative Analysis of Christian Moral Enforcements 
In this context, the Protestant Reformation radically modified both the contents of moral 
rules and the enforcement mechanisms of moral and civil rules alike. The Reformation directly 
affected the three enforcement systems:    5
First, reformers altered the structure of beliefs on salvation, switching from Catholic 
salvation by works to salvation by divine grace alone. Following Max Weber’s The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-1905), many writers have considered that this change in 
beliefs improves economic incentives, especially in the Calvinist version that emphasizes 
predestination but also in the common Protestant focus on ordinary labour and vocation. The 
argument goes that even though good works do not warrant salvation, they serve as a signal to 
the believer, who is therefore moved to constant self-examination, with increased moral 
awareness. Worldly success is also seen as a positive signal when coming from disciplined work 
and not resulting in excessive consumption. Reformers thus modified the contents of the moral 
code in some dimensions with two potentially crucial economic consequences: by giving a more 
positive moral meaning to worldly activities, they encouraged a work ethic that favoured effort; 
and, by frowning on excessive consumption, they encouraged savings. According to this 
argument, the consequences to be expected are that both the laity and the clergy will focus on 
productive activities and abandon unproductive ones. A sort of secular asceticism should 
develop, in which individuals comply with divine plans by punctually performing their earthly 
duties.  
However, the degree of motivation provided by Protestant theology in Weber’s interpretation 
is open to doubt for a variety of reasons. First, there is a psychological inconsistency in that 
Protestant believers are saved by God, with good works contributing nothing. Even 16
th century 
reformers soon realized how difficult it was to “persuade their flocks to be religious, while also 
teaching that ‘good works’ of piety were worthless to earn salvation” (Cameron, 1991: 400). 
Second, Protestant believers could easily deceive themselves when relying on self-examination. 
In contrast, Catholic enforcement was grounded on confession of sins to a priest, which suffers 
greater agency costs but offers specialization advantages (Arruñada, 2009). Third, empirically, 
predestination may trigger very different responses, as shown by its role in Islam (Rodinson, 
1974). Lastly, Catholicism may have been more hospitable to capitalism, at least originally (e.g., 
Dickens: 178-79; Berman, 1983: 337-39).  
Second, the Reformation dismissed the role of the Church as an intermediary between God 
and believers, a role that made lay people passive religious subjects. In the Medieval Church, the 
Bible was interpreted and validated by the Church, and the laity was discouraged from reading it; 
theologists debated in closed academic circles, not allowing the laity to know about their 
controversies; and priests had the power to forgive sins in private sacramental confession, 
thereby ruling on believers’ salvation. The reformers minimized this intermediary role of the 
Church by setting the Bible as the only source, even as the rule according to which to judge the 
Church; and correspondingly empowering the laity, encouraging them to read the Bible, and 
holding theological debates in the open.2 They also abolished the old penitential system, 
eliminating the power of the Church to forgive sins. Most visibly, they eliminated barriers to 
entry by using the vernacular instead of Latin for liturgy and writing.   
This broad empowerment of the laity came with corresponding duties: lay people had to 
know more and, especially, fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of private confession. 
These changes should make lay people abandon their previous passivity, becoming more vigilant 
of their neighbours’ conduct and worrying more about how their own deeds will affect their 
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neighbours’ opinions on them. Mutual social control thus avoided the obvious risk that self-
examination might result in more lenient standards of conduct. These consequences were more 
explicit in stricter communities. For example, the Geneva of Calvin adopted many intrusive 
social controls, such as “family visitations,” by which two elders regularly visited each home to 
discuss the spiritual health of each family. Another classic account of these practices in mutual 
control was also given by Weber in his description of American sects (1920).  
Third, in contrast to the more independent Catholic Church, reformers were more supportive 
of political and legal institutions, often because they needed political support in their fight 
against Catholicism. The Medieval Church had been an international power that held very 
substantial wealth and limited the power of political rulers, frequently opposing them. Where the 
Reformation succeeded, most Church property was soon seized by political rulers, and the 
previous Church privileges were removed. Furthermore, lay rulers rapidly asserted their 
domination of religious affairs. Consequently, many Protestant churches rapidly became 
appendices of local or national rulers. Moreover, in contrast to the ambivalent support provided 
by the Catholic Church to political rulers and the nuanced advice the Church gave to the laity for 
dealing with rulers, reformed churches more flatly affirmed that believers had to obey their 
rulers, as Luther exhorted very early on (1523). Such concentration of political power may have 
and often did result in tyranny. However, in a similar fashion to self-control, it also tended to be 
restrained by more active mutual social control.  
In addition, the changes introduced by the Reformation also made values more homogeneous 
among believers. This should lower the transaction costs of impersonal trade, the sort of trade 
between strangers that has been considered crucial in capitalist economic development at least 
since North and Thomas (1973), and by authors in different disciplines, such as Granovetter 
(1985) and Seabright (2004). The two religions provide markedly different setups in this regard:  
Primarily, Catholic practice favours more diverse moral standards because of both the 
contents and its moral code and, mainly, its enforcement mechanisms. With respect to the code, 
its prioritization of the family encourages selective charity and reinforces in believers their 
natural tendency to favour their relatives and possibly friends over strangers. It therefore 
enhances the use of double standards. With respect to enforcement, both the theology of 
salvation by works and the practice of private confession of sins to a priest support 
heterogeneous standards. First, salvation by works involves an element of individual fine-tuning 
because works cannot be evaluated without considering the possibilities of each individual and 
moral standards are adjusted to specific circumstances. In fact, medieval theologists had 
minutely devised prescriptions for each case, developing the body of “casuistry” literature. 
Private confession also adjusted moral standards to each individual: priests were trained to adapt 
the moral code to the strength of the penitent, even negotiating penance with them. In addition, 
the theology of Purgatory made it possible for merits to be traded amongst believers and with the 
Church, which reinforced inequality (Arruñada, 2009). The sale of indulgences also caused 
greater moral disparity among believers (in addition to considerable rent-seeking, as emphasized 
by Ekelund et al. (1992, 1996, 2002, 2006).  
Conversely, greater homogeneity in the moral standards of Protestantism derives from its 
emphasis on universal charity and its greater reliance on “external” sources for enforcement, 
both second parties and legal institutions. First, the Protestant ideal tends to place obligations to 
strangers on a par with those to family members (McCleary, 2007). Second, compared to the 
secret judgments of the confessional, reliance on external enforcement is likely to produce more   7
equal treatment, as modelled by Glaeser and Glendon (1998). Examples abound, starting with 
John Calvin’s insistence on treating all believers equally, or the community responsibility system 
practiced by the American sects described by Weber (1920), which is somehow similar to the 
late medieval system analyzed by Greif (2002). In this extreme case, as individuals are liable for 
the debts of their colleagues, they will insist that they meet the standards of the group, both on 
admission and later on. Third, more generally, legal enforcement applies the same principle on a 
larger scale, by providing impartial enforcement of obligations without paying attention to who 
the parties are and, in particular, regardless of whether they are locals or outsiders.  
Summing up, the analysis supports two distinctive hypotheses. The work ethic hypothesis 
predicts that Protestant believers work more and more effectively than Catholics. The social 
ethic hypothesis predicts that Protestants show greater concern for social interactions, in terms of 
at least social control, rule of law and homogeneity of values.   
2. Data and Tests 
2.1. Data 
The tests will rely on several econometric models built with cross-section data from the 1998 
religion module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Survey. The ISSP is a 
continuing program of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics of importance for 
research in the social sciences. The surveys were conducted in 1998 and 1999 (8 countries) in a 
total of 32 countries, most of them developed countries, with sample sizes between 804 and 
2,488, and a total of 39,034 observations. After dropping observations with missing values in the 
independent variables, 19,246 observations on Protestants and Catholics remain, which are 
distributed across countries as summarized in Table 1. In each of these national surveys, the 
questionnaires of the religion module included at least 72 questions about the respondents’ 
feelings (for instance, their happiness), values (tolerance of homosexuality, confidence on 
parliaments, trust in strangers and so on), religious beliefs (in heaven, in hell, etc.) and practice 
(church attendance), social habits (different volunteer activities), and opinions (government 
responsibilities), etc.; as well as a full set of demographic variables (sex, marital status, 
education, earnings, etc.). Detailed explanation of all variables is given in Table 6 in the Annex.  
These surveys have been used in many other studies.3 Using ISSP data instead of the World 
Values Survey reduces sample size and the number of countries and variables. It provides, 
however, a more detailed measurement of the intensity of beliefs, which allows me to estimate 
its impact and to distinguish the fixed effect of “belonging” to a religion from the variable effect 
of “believing” its doctrine more or less strongly.   
                                                 
3 Full information on the ISSP surveys is available at http://www.issp.org (accessed January 13, 
2009), including data and codebooks for the religion 1998 module and a list of the thousands of 
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Table 2 summarizes the empirical exercise, in which several tests are used in parallel for each 
of the predictions. These tests rely on several econometric models examining differences in 
values and actions between Protestants and Catholics. For simplicity, observations for members 
of other religions are dropped. In addition, for the Netherlands, data on individual earnings are 
estimated as the predicted values of an OLS regression of available individual earnings on family 
income, family size and education level. Family income is also assumed to be income by other 
family members in the 635 observations for which asserted family income is lower than 
individual earnings. Lastly, given that the surveys provide highly correlated questions for some 
issues, only one variable was used in such cases. When the variables are not so heavily 
correlated, indexes were constructed by using the first principal components of the variables are 
used (Table 7 to Table 11 in the Annex). Results do not materially change as a consequence of 
these imputations and simplifications.    
2.2. Work Ethic  
The work ethic hypothesis will be tested by examining how Protestants and Catholics 
compare in two indicators: (1) the number of weekly Working hours, used as a proxy for the 
willingness to exert effort; and (2) an index of personal Success, built as the first principal 
component of four variables (individual earnings standardized within each country, working as a 
supervisor, being self-employed and each respondent’s subjective social class).  
The predictions are that, within each country and controlling for demographic variables, 
Protestants should work more hours and achieve greater success than Catholics. The reason lies 
in both the emphasis of the Protestant moral code on asceticism and methodical work, and the 
greater motivation supposedly produced by its theology of salvation.  
2.3. Social Ethic 
Predictions of the social ethic hypothesis will be tested in three distinctive areas: social 
control, rule of law and homogeneous values.   
2.3.1. Social Control  
According to the social ethic hypothesis, Protestants should exert a greater effort in mutual 
social control than Catholics. This prediction will be examined in three ways: First, by directly 
testing if Catholics Volunteer less than Protestants. The assumption here is that respondents’ 
volunteering is correlated to their willingness to informally monitor and sanction the behaviour 
of others. This assumption is plausible because mutual control is another form of unrewarded 
volunteering. In addition, some volunteer activities act as enforcement mechanisms themselves, 
because enjoying membership is conditional on complying with a certain pattern of behaviour. 
Volunteer work is gauged with an index built as the first principal component of four variables 
measuring volunteering in political, charitable, religious and other activities. 
Second, by testing if greater levels of education affect differently for Protestants and 
Catholics how much confidence people have in the Church and religious organizations (Trust   9
Church). The hypothesis predicts that, whatever the effect of education, it will be smaller or even 
negative for Catholics, because most reformed churches relinquished some of their functions in 
moral enforcement, correspondingly empowering individuals and encouraging them to learn. 
Therefore, substitution between education and church enforcement was accomplished by 
Protestants centuries ago, while the Catholic Church has retained a more active role in moral 
enforcement. As a consequence, education should be a complement of religion for Protestants 
but a substitute for Catholics.  
Lastly, by similarly testing if greater levels of education affect Religious practice differently 
for Catholics and Protestants, where Religious practice is an index built with four variables 
measuring prayer frequency, participation in church activities, self-description as a religious 
person and frequency of attendance at religious services. Considering the results in the literature 
(Iannaccone, 1998: 1470), greater education is expected to increase religious participation. 
However, the prediction concerns only differences between religions—in particular, it predicts 
that this effect will be significantly smaller for Catholics than for Protestants. The rationale is the 
same as for confidence in the Church. 
2.3.2. Rule of Law  
In terms of the rule of law, the social ethic hypothesis predicts that Protestants support 
political and legal institutions more than Catholics. It will be tested by examining how 
Protestants and Catholics compare with respect to three variables: First, their Tolerance of tax 
fraud. The fact that taxes are necessary for operating political and legal institutions upholds the 
notion that less tolerance of tax fraud is related to greater support of such institutions. In 
addition, the Catholic Church has been relatively lenient with respect to tax fraud, not 
considering it as a serious sin, perhaps as a remnant of the medieval times when it competed for 
tax money with civil rulers. Given the greater support historically given by Protestant churches 
to political rulers, it is predicted that within each country and also controlling for a full set of 
demographic variables, Catholics will be more tolerant of tax fraud.  
Second, their willingness to Cover up for friends, measured through respondents’ reactions to 
the hypothetical case in which they are riding in a car driven too fast by a close friend who hits a 
pedestrian, and this friend asks the respondent to tell the police that he was obeying the speed 
limit. The variable therefore measures individuals’ unwillingness to voluntarily cooperate with 
the legal system and its representatives when this cooperation conflicts with friendship ties. It is 
assumed to indicate how much support respondents provide to third party enforcement. Also in 
this case, it is predicted that Catholics will be more willing to cover up for their friends.  
Lastly, I will examine respondents’ confidence in political and legal institutions, measured 
with the index Trust institutions, which combines confidence in the parliament, and the court and 
legal system. The logic behind these proxies is straightforward, as Parliament establishes the 
legal rules and courts enforce them. Our prediction is that Catholics will be less confident of 
their political and legal institutions.  
2.3.3. Homogeneous Values  
Lastly, the social ethic hypothesis predicts that Protestants hold more homogeneous values 
than Catholics. It will also be examined in three ways: First, the homogeneity of moral standards   10
within the Protestant and Catholic religion will be directly tested by comparing the residuals of 
the regressions on values between the two groups, expecting a higher variance among Catholics.  
Second, homogeneity of values will be tested indirectly by examining how Protestants and 
Catholics compare with respect to a measure of interpersonal generalized trust, given by 
responses to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Trust strangers). This variable is often related 
to “social capital” (Putnam, 1993) and is thought to convey trust in strangers (Knack and Keefer, 
1997). Its connection to homogeneity is clear if people trust strangers more in homogeneous 
societies, as argued by Alesina and LaFerrara (2000, 2002), an idea grounded both on social 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and evolutionary psychology (Trivers, 1971). The prediction is that 
Catholics should trust strangers less than Protestants.   
Complementarily, I will finally check the importance individuals give to their family, to 
examine the argument put forward by Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995) and others that there is 
substitution between the strength of family ties and formal institutions. Lacking direct measures, 
I will use as a proxy the difference in individuals’ stated tolerance of heterosexual relations 
before and after marriage. The prediction is that this index of Importance of family, measured as 
the gap between tolerance of premarital sex and adultery, will be greater for Catholics.  
2.4. Models 
2.4.1. Main Model 
To perform most of these tests, the following equations will be estimated: 
Yi =   α0     + α0c Catholic  
+  β1 Faith  + β1c Catholic × Faith 
+  β2 Religious upbringing  + β2c CatholicR × Religious upbringing 
+  β3 Education  + β3c Catholic × Education 
     +  Σt (βt Controlm variables) 
     +  Σr (βr Countryn dummies) (1) 
where each dependent variable, Yi, represents a value or action, as stated by respondents to the 
survey, from their weekly working hours to their trust in strangers. Half of the dependent 
variables are expressed in terms of categories with a natural order. Ordered probit models are 
estimated in these cases, and ordinary least squares are used for the rest. The regressions of 
Working hours and Positive working hours are tobit and probit models.  All equations were 
estimated using weight adjustments with robust (Huber-White) standard errors. Neither the 
choice of model nor the use of survey estimation materially affect the results. 
Independent variables are as follows: 
•  Catholic is a binary variable that takes value one for respondents who state that they 
belong to the Catholic religion, zero otherwise. The default category is Protestant.   11
•  Faith is an index measuring the intensity of respondents’ faith. Simplicity plus the 
substantial collinearity among the three belief variables (in the afterlife, heaven and 
hell) advise using a composite index of belief intensity, built as the first principal 
component of the three variables.  
•  Upbringing measures the degree of religious indoctrination that respondents received 
during their childhood. This is taken directly from a survey question asking 
respondents how often they attended religious services when they were around 11 or 
12 years old.   
•  Education measures the highest degree of education reached by respondents.  
•  Interactive variables, built as products of Catholic times Faith, Upbringing and 
Education, are introduced to test differences in the effects of faith, upbringing and 
education between the two religions. CatholicR is a dummy that takes value one for 
those raised as Catholics.  
•  Control variables were introduced for the sex of respondents, their age and age 
squared, and their marital status (through three dummies for widows, divorced and 
separated and single), as well as country dummies.  
2.4.2. Fixed and Variable Effects of Religion 
Model (1) distinguishes between fixed and variable “effects” of the two religions on values 
and behaviour. Fixed effects are related to membership or, more broadly, to “belonging” to a 
particular religious group, and do not vary across believers of a given faith. In our case, their 
coefficients (α0c) estimate the difference between belonging to Catholicism and  Protestantism, 
because observations for other religions have been dropped. Furthermore, given that Faith, 
Upbringing and Education have been standardized within the sample, these fixed effects 
measure attitudes for the average person in the whole sample of Catholics and Protestants 
(average not only in terms of the demographic controls but also in terms of Faith, Religious 
upbringing and Education). Their estimates are given in the first row of Table 4.  
In addition to these fixed or belonging effects, the two religions provide different structures 
of beliefs and enforcement that are predicted to lead to different variable effects, meaning in our 
case that the intensity of belief, the degree of religious upbringing and the degree of education 
should affect values and actions for Protestants and Catholics differently. In the equations, we 
take Protestants as the omitted category, estimating Protestant variable effects with coefficients 
βj, and the differential impact of Catholic Faith, Upbringing and Education with coefficients βjc, 
with j = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Their estimates are given in the rows corresponding to the 
interactive variables in Panel A of Table 4. In the case of education, estimating variable effects is 
useful to test the social control hypothesis whereas, for faith and upbringing, estimated variable 
effects give us a glimpse into the effects that religion may have exerted in the past, when both 
the intensity of religious belief and the degree of religious indoctrination can be assumed to be 
greater then they are now in most societies.  
Complementarily, the overall effect of “being Catholic” will be estimated with a simplified 
version of model (1) in which the variables Faith, Upbringing, Education and their interactions 
are excluded, such that the new coefficients of the Catholic variable estimate how average 
Catholics in the sample differ from average Protestants after controlling for demographic and   12
country effects but not for the intensity of their faith, upbringing and education. Estimates of 
these average effects are given in the first row of Panel B in Table 4.  
3. Results 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the data used for the analysis. Most differences in 
means and standard deviations for Protestants and Catholics are consistent with the hypotheses. 
Table 4 presents the main results, obtained by estimating the effects of the two religions on a 
variety of values, conducts and facts. Catholicism is represented by a dummy binary variable, 
with Protestantism as the omitted category. Results for constants, control variables and country 
dummies are omitted but their use is supported by their statistically significant correlations with 
the dependent variables and the fact that most control variables show the expected signs. The 
Table contains two panels. Panel A shows the results for models in equation (1), with variable 
effects, while Panel B presents the average effects obtained with the simplified model.  
3.1. The Work Ethic Hypothesis 
Results hardly provide any support for the work ethics hypothesis. Despite the fact that on 
average Protestants work 8.5% more hours and show greater personal success, the significance 
of these differences disappears after controlling for demographic and country effects according 
to the non-significant coefficients of fixed effects in Table 4, both for the standard person in the 
sample (panel A) and for the standard member of each religion (panel B).  
Results on working hours, a variable that measures working time at all jobs, but not time 
worked at home, are slightly ambiguous with respect to the differential effects of the intensity of 
religious belief and upbringing between Catholics and Protestants. As shown in panel A, for 
Catholics, stronger faith and religious upbringing are associated with fewer working hours 
(equation [1]). However, this result seems to be driven by the fact that the only working hours 
considered are those worked in jobs. Catholics are indeed less likely to report positive working 
hours (equation [2]). However, for those Catholics with positive working hours, belief intensity 
is associated with a greater number of working hours (equation [3]), a result driven fully by 
Catholic women. Overall, the results seem to reflect a difference between the two religions as to 
occupational patterns, which cannot be fully clarified without knowing how many hours the two 
types of respondents work outside their jobs. With the data available, the observed difference—
which refers only to the effect of faith and upbringing—cannot be ascribed to a differential 
willingness to exert effort. It seems more likely to respond or at least be heavily influenced by 
different priorities in allocating time between the family and the outside world, an interpretation 
that fits in well with the greater importance that Catholics grant to the family (section 3.2.3).  
Results for personal success are even clearer, with no significant differences being observed 
when controlling for demographic and country variables, neither in the fixed effect of belonging 
to a religion nor in the variable effects of religious belief intensity or upbringing.    13
3.2. The Social Ethic Hypothesis 
3.2.1. Social Control 
Results confirm the three social control predictions. First, average Catholics not only 
volunteer work significantly less than Protestants (on average, about .159 standard deviations) 
but volunteering increases with faith and upbringing less than half for Catholics than what it does 
for Protestants. Catholic values are thus more weakly linked to volunteering and therefore are 
allegedly less conducive to mutual control, to the extent that mutual control relies on volunteer 
enforcement work and many organizations based on volunteer work also act as enforcement 
devices by, for example, screening access to social networks.   
Second, the data show an acute contrast in the relationship between education and confidence 
in churches and religious organizations: better-educated Protestants trust them more whereas 
better-educated Catholics trust them less (from a rate of .074 standard deviations of trust for each 
deviation in education for Protestants to -.090 deviations for Catholics). Catholics also show 
more confidence in their Church, and their confidence increases with their faith and religious 
upbringing. However, greater confidence can be interpreted in different ways. 
Third, education has a similarly contrasting effect on religious practice because, even if in 
this case education has for Catholics a slightly positive instead of a negative effect, this 
attenuation probably is at least partly driven by the likely presence of a social element in the 
demand for religious practice, as argued by Sacerdote and Glaeser (2008).  
These contrasting effects of education support the idea that for Protestants education 
complements religion whereas for Catholics education substitutes for religion. It therefore seems 
that the Catholic Church is less in tune with its more educated laity, possibly due to the greater 
role the Catholic Church plays as an enforcer, which conflicts more with educated laity.  
3.2.2. Rule of Law  
Results clearly confirm two of the three predictions according to which Protestants support 
political and legal institutions more than Catholics. 
First, Catholics are significantly more tolerant of tax fraud than Protestants, in line with 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003). Furthermore, even if strong Catholic beliefs are associated 
with less tolerance of tax fraud, this association is about a third weaker than among Protestants. 
The result therefore confirms that, as predicted, Catholic values are less supportive of those 
political and legal institutions that are financed with taxation.  
Second, Catholics are also more willing to cover up for their delinquent friends in dealings 
with the police, and strong Catholic beliefs have a similarly positive but weaker effect. This 
result confirms that Catholic values elicit less cooperation from citizens in the functioning of 
legal institutions when they conflict with smaller social circles, such as the ones defined by 
friendship ties.  
Third, no significant differences are observed between Protestants and Catholics with respect 
to their confidence in political and legal institutions, measured through the index of Trust 
institutions. Strong Catholic believers even show more confidence than strong Protestant 
believers, with Catholic faith showing almost twice the effect of Protestant faith, in line with   14
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), who find Catholics trust both the Government and the 
legal system more than Protestants.  
The results for this third proxy of institutional support might be reconciled with those for the 
two other proxies by considering that citizens’ uncritical confidence in political and legal 
institutions does not improve the functioning of these institutions. According to this argument, 
by empowering individuals, Protestantism has ended up encouraging a relatively more sceptical 
view on institutions and not only on the institutionalized Church. Protestants are more willing to 
contribute to the public good by punishing tax fraud socially, denouncing misbehaviour even at 
the cost of losing friends and holding a sceptical view of institutions.  
This interpretation emphasizes the empowerment of individuals which was used mainly to 
justify the social control hypothesis, and therefore reinforces the social control hypothesis to the 
detriment of the rule of law hypothesis, grounded on the direct political prescriptions of 
Protestant churches.  
3.2.3. Homogeneous Values  
Different versions of our two tests confirm that Protestants hold more homogeneous values 
than Catholics. 
First, most standard deviations are significantly smaller for the Protestant sub-sample, both in 
the original data (Table 3) and, more revealingly, in the residuals of the regressions (Table 5). 
This greater homogeneity should reduce the exchange costs faced by members of the more 
homogeneous group, both within and outside the group, by easing coordination tasks. This effect 
on coordination would be enhanced by the fact that such homogeneity is present in all 
unobservable variables, while the only significant exceptions (personal success and volunteer 
work) are easy to observe and, therefore, are of lesser consequence for trade. This result is 
reaffirmed when comparing the standard deviations of residuals obtained in regressions of the 
unobservable on all observable variables (as done in Table 12 in the Annex).  
Both religions may thus be suitable for supporting human interaction in different kinds of 
environment and transaction. In comparison with the more homogeneous Protestant ethic, the 
more diverse Catholic moral standards may increase transaction costs in impersonal trading but 
also make personal trade easier, by better adapting moral incentives to the diverse situations 
faced by believers. These well-adapted incentives and standards probably perform better than 
more general solutions in the self-control sphere. This is so because, when parties know each 
other, they can use additional information when transacting. This is more likely to happen in 
rural environments and, more generally, for friends and family-related interactions. With its 
relatively more homogeneous standards, Protestantism seems, however, better adapted for 
impersonal trading between anonymous parties, such as those in commerce, finance and 
industry, a conclusion in line with that of Blum and Dudley (2001).  
Second, average Catholics trust strangers less, confirming the findings of Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2003) with individual data, the  cross-country results of La Porta et al. (1997) and 
Inglehart (1999), and the prediction of Putnam (1993), even though no differences between 
Catholics and Protestants are observed with respect to how their intensity of religious beliefs or 
upbringing affect their trust in strangers. It also remains an open question to what extent this 
greater trust might result from greater homogeneity. However, whatever its origins, greater trust 
would have important economic consequences, given its role in conforming initial expectations   15
that are crucial in making cooperative strategies viable in repeated games, for instance when 
implementing a “tit for tat” strategy, and the correlation established between trust and economic 
growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).  
Third, Catholics not only give more importance than Protestants to family ties, but Catholic 
beliefs and upbringing are also positively related to the proxy of family importance, which is in 
line with the argument of Putnam (1993). This greater importance of the family tallies with the 
propensity shown by Catholics to take occupational choices that favour “production” within the 
family and might hinder the functioning of institutions, for example through nepotism. When 
adding the greater proclivity of Catholics to cover up for their friends and their lesser trust in 
strangers, the “social ethic” of Catholicism seems to favour personal exchange to the detriment 
of impersonal exchange.  
3.3. Discussion 
These results suffer several limitations. First of all, finding significant correlations does not 
necessarily imply causation. It is possible that hidden variables may be affecting both the 
religiosity and other values. The analysis attenuates this problem by relying on within-country 
variation and by estimating fixed and variable effects, as it can be assumed that the fixed effects 
are relatively more exogenous. In addition, as argued by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003, 
2006), the significance of the religious upbringing variable supports the notion that causality runs 
from religion to values. 
Second, the data are built from statements on values instead of observations on actual 
behaviour. Given the nature of some of the questions (for example, whether one tolerates tax 
fraud), one should expect some bias caused by a certain tendency to lie because of “political 
correctness”. However, given that the analysis here focuses on differences between Catholics and 
Protestants, this bias should matter only to the extent that the proclivity to lying varies 
systematically between both religions.  
Third, many of these tests use values to test hypotheses about actions. Some support for this 
approximation is given by empirical tests showing that, when responding on values, people tend 
to convey information on their own predispositions. For instance, self-reported trust has also 
been shown to be a good proxy of trustworthiness actions in an experimental setting (Glaeser et 
al., 2000).  
Fourth, given that these results have been obtained with current data, it could be claimed that 
the two theologies of salvation in Catholicism and Protestantism did provide different work 
ethics effects in the past but these differential effects have now disappeared. Such dilution of 
differences seems unlikely, however, when considering that social norms change slowly; 
therefore, current values may inform us on the effects of past values. As Glaeser and Glendon 
put it, “current social norms may still be the legacy of prior religious beliefs” (1998: 431). 
Moreover, if we take the differential effects of intense beliefs as a proxy for the differential 
effects that both religions may have had in a more religious past, the estimates lend more support 
to the social ethic than to the work ethic hypothesis. Even the differences observed in working 
hours seem to reflect occupational choices that are more consistent with the social ethic 
hypothesis.    16
Lastly, large sample size tends to cause statistical significance even with slight substantive 
effects. However, in this case, when evaluating substantive significance, it must be remembered 
that the effects of religions are underestimated because only within-country variation is 
considered. Much of the influence that religion has exerted throughout history has been through 
changes in the fabric of different societies. This effect is embodied here in the country dummy 
variables. This ensures that observed differences are not wrongly attributed to religion, but it also 
reduces the apparent explanatory power of religion. The overall consistency of results, both 
internal—between the battery of variables used in the paper—and external—with respect to 
those in the literature—, also rules out the possibility that they might be driven by mere chance, 
in the spirit of Meehl (1978).  
4. Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the article finds little support in survey data on currently held values for Weber’s 
“work ethic” hypothesis in “The Protestant Ethic,” by which Protestants would tend to work 
more and more efficiently than Catholics. It finds substantial support, however, for an alternative 
“social ethic” argument, as Protestant values are shown to shape a type of individual who exerts 
greater effort in mutual social control, supports institutions more and more critically, is less 
bound to close circles of family and friends and also holds more homogeneous values. In 
Weberian terms, the data are therefore more supportive of Weber’s view in “The Protestant 
Sects,” with its emphasis on mutual social control.  
In line with these results, the economic contribution of the Protestant Reformation would 
have been connected not to the psychology of individuals regarding economic activity but to 
their empowerment as citizens vis-à-vis other citizens, the community and the State, affecting the 
relative effectiveness of alternative enforcement systems. The consequences for economic 
growth and the development of Capitalism would be related, first, to the greater effort that 
individuals are willing to exert in informal social enforcement; second, to the contribution that 
having more independent individuals makes to the design and functioning of political and legal 
institutions; and, lastly, to the greater homogeneity of values among individuals. All these 
features work in favour of anonymous markets, as they facilitate legal enforcement and reduce 
the cost of impersonal exchange.    17
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Table 1. Sample Description: Useful Observations Available for Each Country and Religion 





(3) = (1)+(2) 
Australia  553  48.47% 270  23.66% 823  4.28% 
Germany  (West)  330  42.80% 301  39.04% 631  3.28% 
Germany  (East)  187  24.44%  35 4.58%  222 1.15% 
UK  253  42.81%  55 9.31%  308 1.60% 
Northern  Ireland  325  52.59% 232  37.54% 557  2.89% 
USA  574  57.17% 272  27.09% 846  4.40% 
Austria  40 5.15%  629 80.95%  669  3.48% 
Hungary  168  17.45% 523  54.31% 691  3.59% 
Italy  2 0.25%  714 89.81%  716  3.72% 
Ireland  43 5.07%  763 89.98%  806  4.19% 
Netherlands  264  18.12% 266  18.26% 530  2.75% 
Norway  826  83.10%  5 0.50%  831 4.32% 
Sweden  568  68.77%  7 0.85%  575 2.99% 
Czechia  56 5.43%  475 46.07%  531  2.76% 
Slovenia  14 1.80%  553 71.17%  567  2.95% 
Poland  0 0.00%  724 92.82%  724  3.76% 
Bulgaria  1  0.11% 14  1.55% 15  0.08% 
Russia  14  1.32%  1 0.09%  15 0.08% 
New  Zealand  337  43.21% 117  15.00% 454  2.36% 
Canada  158  27.38% 199  34.49% 357  1.85% 
Philippines  91 8.20%  948 85.41%  1,039  5.40% 
Israel  0  0.00% 2  0.18% 2  0.01% 
Japan  20  2.71%  0 0.00%  20 0.10% 
Spain  5 0.26%  1,640 83.97%  1,645  8.55% 
Latvia  225  23.94% 200  21.28% 425  2.21% 
Slovakia  149  13.48% 775  70.14% 924  4.80% 
France  18 2.04%  405 45.87%  423  2.20% 
Cyprus  0  0.00% 13  1.50% 13  0.07% 
Portugal  0 0.00%  987 89.32%  987  5.13% 
Chile  275  20.12% 1,020  74.62% 1,295  6.73% 
Denmark  857  86.13%  1 0.10%  858 4.46% 
Switzerland  332  38.74% 415  48.42% 747  3.88% 
Total  6,685  21.92% 12,561  41.19% 19,246  100.00%   21
Table 2. Summary of Predictions and Results 
Catholics show more (+) or less (-)  
of the corresponding indicator 
Hypotheses  Variables  
and tests  Proxies used 
Predictions Results 
Working hours  - n.  s. 
Positive working 
hours  - n.  s.  Work effort  Willingness to work 
and work effort 
Working hours of 
those working  - n.  s. 
Work ethic: 
Catholics work less 
and less effectively 
than Protestants 
Earthly achievements   Earthly achievements   Success index -  n.  s. 
Social control: 
Catholics exert less 
effort in mutual social 
control than 
Protestants  
Willingness to exert 
effort in social 
enforcement 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Catholics and Protestants:         
Working hours  17,640 22.335 22.783  0.000  96.000 
Positive working hours  19,246 0.583 0.493  0.000  1.000 
Working hours of those working  9,614 40.981 13.721  1.000  96.000 
Success index  12,893 0.000 1.000  -1.743  13.297 
Volunteer index  18,521 0.000 1.000  -0.642  5.038 
Trust Church  18,654 3.224 1.097  1.000  5.000 
Religious practice index  18,553 0.000 1.000  -2.099  2.247 
Tolerance of tax fraud  18,666 2.005 0.909  1.000  4.000 
Cover up for friends  16,469 1.871 0.867  1.000  4.000 
Trust institutions  18,046 0.000 1.000  -2.037  2.523 
Trust strangers  18,869 2.319 0.794  1.000  4.000 
Importance of family  18,158 1,503 1,209  -3.000  3.000 
Catholic  19,246 0.653 0.476  0.000  1.000 
Faith  19,246 0.000 1.000  -1.742  1.261 
Religious upbringing  19,246 0.000 1.000  -2.155  1.205 
Education  19,246 0.000 1.000  -2.376  1.794 
Women  19,246 0.557 0.497  0.000  1.000 
Age  19,246 0.000 1.000  -1.752  2.820 
Age squared  19,246 0.000 1.000  -1.286  3.877 
Widowed  19,246 0.093 0.291  0.000  1.000 
Divorced & separated  19,246 0.065 0.247  0.000  1.000 
Single  19,246 0.215 0.411  0.000  1.000 
Protestants:        
Working hours  5,803 23.691 21.790  0.000  96.000 
Positive working hours  6,685 0.658 0.474  0.000  1.000 
Working hours of those working  3,520 39.057 13.510  1.000  96.000 
Success index  3,876 0.165 1.042  -1.743  5.325 
Volunteer index  6,254 0.142 1.067  -0.642  5.038 
Trust Church  6,408 3.114 1.049  1.000  5.000 
Religious practice index  6,348 -0.243  1.084  -2.099  2.247 
Tolerance of tax fraud  6,504 1.952 0.852  1.000  4.000 
Cover up for friends  5,708 1.852 0.767  1.000  4.000 
Trust institutions  6,360 0.109 0.954  -2.037  2.523 
Trust strangers  6,535 2.532 0.759  1.000  4.000 
Importance of family  6,392 1.643 1.169  -3.000  3.000 
Catholic  6,685 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Faith  6,685 -0.181  1.033  -1.742  1.261 
Religious upbringing  6,685 -0.498  1.070  -2.155  1.205 
Education  6,685 0.171 0.946  -2.376  1.794 
Women  6,685 0.552 0.497  0.000  1.000 
Age  6,685 0.055 1.000  -1.752  2.820 
Age squared  6,685 0.053 1.016  -1.286  3.877 
Widowed  6,685 0.091 0.288  0.000  1.000 
Divorced & separated  6,685 0.082 0.275  0.000  1.000 
Single  6,685 0.211 0.408  0.000  1.000 
Catholics:        
Working hours  11,837 21.670 23.227  0.000  96.000 
Positive working hours  12,561 0.543 0.498  0.000  1.000 
Working hours of those working  6,094 42.093 13.720  2.000  96.000 
Success index  9,017 -0.071  0.973  -1.743  13.297 
Volunteer index  12,267 -0.072  0.956  -0.642  5.038 
Trust Church  12,246 3.282 1.117  1.000  5.000 
Religious practice index  12,205 0.126 0.929  -2.099  2.247 
Tolerance of tax fraud  12,162 2.033 0.937  1.000  4.000 
Cover up for friends  10,761 1.881 0.916  1.000  4.000 
Trust institutions  11,686 -0.060  1.019  -2.037  2.523 
Trust strangers  12,334 2.206 0.789  1.000  4.000 
Importance of family  11,766 1.426 1.224  -3.000  3.000 
Catholic  12,561 1.000 0.000  1.000  1.000 
Faith  12,561 0.096 0.969  -1.742  1.261 
Religious upbringing  12,561 0.265 0.849  -2.155  1.205 
Education  12,561 -0.091  1.016  -2.376  1.794 
Women  12,561 0.559 0.496  0.000  1.000 
Age  12,561 -0.029  0.999  -1.752  2.820 
Age squared  12,561 -0.028  0.990  -1.286  3.877 
Widowed  12,561 0.094 0.292  0.000  1.000 
Divorced & separated  12,561 0.056 0.230  0.000  1.000 
Single  12,561 0.217 0.412  0.000  1.000   23 
Table 4. Religious Determinants of Economic Values (Omitted Category: Protestants) 
  Hypotheses with corresponding dependent variables (units in parentheses)—estimated equations in columns 
  Social ethic hypothesis 
  Work ethic hypothesis 
Social control   Rule of law   Homogeneous values  













































a 1-4 scale) 
(responses on 





a 1-4 scale) 
(differences 
in responses 
on a -3 to +3 
scale) 
Panel A: Differences between Catholics and Protestants (regressions with variable effects): 
Catholic  -0.438 -0.014 0.033  -0.012 -0.190
*** 0.016  -0.034
* 0.117
*** 0.087
*** -0.012  -0.061
** 0.111
*** 










*** 0.025  -0.230
*** 
  (0.456) (0.023) (0.256) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 






*** 0.022  -0.069
























*** 0.021  0.121
***  Catholic ×  
Faith  (0.571) (0.027) (0.316) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
-1.651
*** -0.040  -0.374  0.008  -0.054
*** 0.055
*** 0.048
***  0.024 -0.006  0.011 0.009 0.060
***  CatholicR × Reli-
gious upbringing  (0.591) (0.028) (0.320) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) 
0.067 -0.035  -0.821
*** -0.024  -0.018  -0.164
*** -0.091
*** 0.072
*** 0.014  -0.082
*** -0.009  0.104
***  Catholic × 
Education  (0.553) (0.028) (0.312) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Observations 17640 18233 9614  12893 18521 18654 18553 18666 16469 18046 18869  18158 
 
F    80.20 38.97 121.01  49.44 204.23  564.95  28.40 28.85 70.78 61.70  70.13   
Panel B: Average differences between Catholics and Protestants (regressions without variable effects): 





** 0.007  -0.047
* 0.110
*** 
  (0.762) (0.035) (0.428) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) 
Observations 17640 18233 9614  12893 18521 18654 18553 18666 16469 18046 18869 18158 
F    89.80 45.37 70.08 39.08 304.39  174.11  30.07 30.32 72.57 63.66 78.27 
Source of data: ISSP (1998). Notes: All models (in columns) estimated with constants and demographic and country controls, whose coefficients are not reported in the Table. Equation 1, tobit; equation 2, probit; 
equations 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, OLS; all others, ordered probit; survey estimation in all cases. 
*,
 **,
 *** Significant at 10, 5 and 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.    24
 
Table 5. Comparison of Residual Heterogeneity between Catholics and Protestants  
(Standard Deviations of OLS Regression Errors) 
Variable Protestants  Catholics  Difference  Difference  
(in %) 
Working hours  17.362 19.486  -2.124
*** -12.23% 
Positive working hours  0.373 0.412  -0.039
*** -10.41% 
Working hours of those working  20.079 21.781  -1.701
*** -8.47% 
Success index  0.875 0.819  0.056
*** 6.35% 
Volunteer  0.976 0.904  0.071
*** 7.32% 
Trust Church  0.929 0.966  -0.037
*** -4.01% 
Religious practice  0.712 0.690  0.022  3.11% 
Tolerance of tax fraud  0.822 0.901  -0.079
*** -9.69% 
Cover up for friends  0.734 0.881  -0.147
*** -20.09% 
Trust institutions  0.891 0.941  -0.050
*** -5.59% 
Trust strangers  0.701 0.747  -0.046
*** -6.62% 
Importance of family  1.048 1.124  -0.076
*** -7,20% 
Source of data: ISSP (1998).  
Notes: Calculated from residuals in OLS regressions with the same independent variables as in Panel A of Table 4.  
**, 
*** Significant at 5 and 1%, using the Levene (1960) robust test for equality of variances.    25
5. Annex 
Table 6. Description of Variables 
Variable name  Original name in ISSP 1998  Survey question 
(US version when there are variations) 
Data transforma-
tions and meaning 
of variables 
Dependent variables:       
Working hours  v213rhoursworkedweekly  Hours worked weekly (How many hours did you work 
last week, how many hours do you usually work a 
week, at all jobs?) 
Observations omitted 
if hours = 0 
Hours worked / week 
Success  Index  Built with the scores of first principal component from 
variables v211, v214, v215 (Earnings) and v219 
(details in next rows and Annex) 
Standardized 
 v211rselfemployedi  In your (main) job are you an employee or self-
employed? 
Binary  
 v214rsupervisei In your main job, do you supervise anyone or are you 
directly responsible for the work of other people? 
Idem. 
 v215rearningsi Respondent’s earnings (from all jobs in 1997 before 
taxes or other deductions in $) 
Standardized within 
each country 
 v219rsubjectivesocialclass  Subjective social class (If you were asked to use one of 
four names for your social class, which would you say 
you belong to: the lower, the working, the middle, or 
the upper class?) 
Binary 
Volunteer  Index  Built with the scores of first principal component from 
variables v32 to v35 (details in next rows and Annex) 
Standardized 
 v32volunteerworkpoliticalactivit  During the last 12 months did you do volunteer work 
in any of the following areas: Political activities 
(helping political parties, political movements, election 
campaigns, etc.) 
Amount of work 
 v33volunteerworkcharitableactivi  Idem: Charitable activities (helping the sick, elderly, 
poor, etc.) 
Idem. 
 v34volunteerworkreligiousactivit  Idem: Religious and church-related activities (helping 
churches and religious groups) 
Idem. 
 v35anyotherkindofvolunteerwork  Idem: Any other kind of voluntary activities  Idem. 
Religious practice  Index  Built with the scores of first principal component from 
variables v58, v59, v60 and v218 (details in next rows 
and Annex) 
Standardized 
 v58abouthowoftendoyoupray  About how often do you pray?  Frequency 
 v59howoftentakepartinchurchactiv  How often do you take part in the activities or 
organizations of a church or a place of worship, other 
than attending services? 
Frequency 
 v60rdescribeselfasreligious  Would you describe yourself as extremely religious / 
very religious / somewhat religious / neither religious 
nor non-religious / somewhat non-religious / very non-
religious / extremely non-religious?  
Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with religiosity 




Trust Church  v22confidenceinchurches+religorg?  Confidence in: Churches and religious organizations  Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with confidence 
Tolerance of tax fraud  v16taxpayernotreportincomelesstax  Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does 
not report all of his or her income in order to pay less 
income taxes? 
Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with tolerance 
Cover up for friends  v63rsdecisioninthissituation  Suppose you were riding in a car driven by a close 
friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a 
pedestrian. He asks you to tell the police that he was 
obeying the speed limit… (b) What would you do in 
this situation? (Possible answers: Definitely / Probably 
tell the police that your friend was / was not going 
faster than the speed limit) 
Stated cover up   26
Variable name  Original name in ISSP 1998  Survey question 
(US version when there are variations) 
Data transforma-
tions and meaning 
of variables 
Trust institutions  Index  Built with the scores of first principal component from 
variables v20 and v23 (details in next rows and Annex) 
Standardized 
 v20howmuchconfidenceinparliament?  How much confidence do you have in respondent’s 
country’s Parliament? (use national legislature, e.g. 
U.S. Congress) 
Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with confidence 
 v23confidenceincourts&legalsystem?  Idem in courts and the legal system?  Idem. 
Trust strangers  v19trustinpeopleorcantbetoocareful  Generally speaking, would you say that people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? (Possible answers: People can almost always / 
usually be trusted, You usually / always can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people) 
Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with the level of trust 
Importance of family  Index  Built as difference between individual tolerance of 
premarital sex and adultery (details in next rows) 
 
 v7sexualrelationsbeforemarriage?  Do you think it is wrong or not wrong if a man and a 
woman have sexual relations before marriage? 
Tolerance 
 v8sexualrelationswothersthanspouse  Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for a married 
person having sexual relations with someone other 
than his or her husband or wife? 
Tolerance 
Independent variables:       
Catholic v217rreligiousdenomination  Religious denomination: Which religious group do you 
belong to? (What is your religious preference? Do you 
regard yourself as belonging to any particular 
religion?) 
Binary variable: = 1, 




CatholicR v53religionrespondentwasraisedin  What religion, if any, were you raised in? Was it 
Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no 
religion? 
Binary variable: = 1, 
if raised as Catholic; = 
0, otherwise. Greek 
Catholics considered 
as Catholic 
Faith  Index  Built with the scores of first principal component from 
variables v39 to v41 (details in next rows and Annex) 
Standardized 
 v39rbelieveinlifeafterdeath  Do you believe in life after death?  Recoded for the 
variable to increase 
with the strength of 
belief. Australian data 
recoded for 
homogeneity.  
 v40rbelieveinheaven  Do you believe in heaven?  Idem. 
 v41rbelieveinhell  Do you believe in hell?  Idem. 
Upbringing v57rage1112yrshowoftenattendchur  How often did you attend religious services when you 




Education v205reducationiicategories  Education II: Categories (What is the highest degree?)  Standardized 
Control variables:       
Women v200rsex  Sex of respondent  Recoded: 1, if female; 
0, male 
Age v201rage  Age of respondent  Years of age, 
standardized 
Age Squared  v201rage  Age of respondent  Years of age, squared 
and standardized 
Widowed v202rmaritalstatus  Marital status: widowed  Binary variable 
Divorced & Separated  v202rmaritalstatus  Marital status: divorced or separated  Idem. 
Single v202rmaritalstatus  Marital status: never married, not married, single 
(“living as married” computed as married) 
Idem. 
Note: Additional information on the ISSP survey and codebook available at http://www.issp.org/ (accessed January 13, 2009).   27
Table 7. Principal Component Analysis Used to Build the Success Index 
Component Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1 1.59942  0.58595  0.3999  0.3999 
3 0.77298  0.15885  0.1932  0.8465 
4 0.61413  .  0.1535  1.0000 
   Eigenvectors    
Variable 1  2  3  4 
v215rearningsi 0.61486  -0.00768  -0.28992  -0.73337 
v211rselfemployedi  0.23739 0.86632  0.43917  0.01634 
v214rsupervisei  0.60110 0.04004  -0.42895  0.67312 
v219rsubjectivesocialclass   0.45197  -0.49782  0.73422  0.09389 
  Scoring 
Coefficients 
   
Variable 1       
v215rearningsi 0.61486       
v211rselfemployedi  0.23739      
v214rsupervisei  0.60110      
v219rsubjectivesocialclass   0.45197         28
Table 8. Principal Component Analysis Used to Build the Volunteer Index 
Component Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1 1.83282  0.95133  0.4582  0.4582 
2 0.88149  0.14555  0.2204  0.6786 
3 0.73593  0.18617  0.1840  0.8626 
4 0.54976  .  0.1374  1.0000 
   Eigenvectors    
Variable 1  2  3  4 
v32volunteerworkpoliticalactivit  0.35444 0.93141  -0.08257  0.00486 
v33volunteerworkcharitableactivi  0.57638 -0.23154  -0.18256  -0.76213 
v34volunteerworkreligiousactivit  0.54374 -0.25569  -0.51417  0.61205 
v35anyotherkindofvolunteerwork  0.49650 -0.11611  0.83396  0.21100 
  Scoring 
Coefficients 
   
Variable 1     
v32volunteerworkpoliticalactivit  0.35444      
v33volunteerworkcharitableactivi  0.57638      
v34volunteerworkreligiousactivit  0.54374      
v35anyotherkindofvolunteerwork  0.49650        29
Table 9. Principal Component Analysis Used to Build the Trust institutions Index 
Component Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1 1.44945  0.89890  0.7247  0.7247 
2 0.55055  .  0.2753  1.0000 
   Eigenvectors    
Variable 1  2     
v20howmuchconfidenceinparliament  0.70711 0.70711     
v23confidenceincourtslegalsystem  0.70711 -0.70711     
  Scoring 
Coefficients 
   
Variable 1       
v20howmuchconfidenceinparliament  0.70711      
v23confidenceincourtslegalsystem  0.70711        30
Table 10. Principal Component Analysis Used to Build the Religious practice Index 
Component Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1 2.53704  1.86219  0.6343  0.6343 
2 0.67485  0.23244  0.1687  0.8030 
3 0.44242  0.09673  0.1106  0.9136 
4 0.34569  .  0.0864  1.0000 
   Eigenvectors    
Variable 1  2  3  4 
v58abouthowoftendoyoupray   0.52696 -0.32697  -0.33115  0.71116 
v59howoftentakepartinchurchactiv   0.43722 0.83146  0.28472  0.19089 
v60rdescribeselfasreligious   0.49695 -0.44558  0.70291  -0.24579 
v218rreligiousserviceshowoften  0.53310 0.05665  -0.56142  -0.63040 
  Scoring 
Coefficients 
   
Variable 1       
v58abouthowoftendoyoupray   0.52696      
v59howoftentakepartinchurchactiv   0.43722      
v60rdescribeselfasreligious   0.49695      
v218rreligiousserviceshowoften  0.53310        31
Table 11. Principal Component Analysis Used to Build the Faith Index 
Component Eigenvalue  Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
1 2.38206  1.97387  0.7940  0.7940 
2 0.40820  0.19846  0.1361  0.9301 
3 0.20974  .  0.0699  1.0000 
   Eigenvectors    
Variable 1  2  3   
v39rbelieveinlifeafterdeath  0.55420 0.78745  0.26980   
v40rbelieveinheaven  0.60133 -0.15464  -0.78389   
v41rbelieveinhell  0.57555 -0.59667  0.55922   
  Scoring 
Coefficients 
   
Variable 1       
v39rbelieveinlifeafterdeath  0.55420      
v40rbelieveinheaven  0.60133      
v41rbelieveinhell  0.57555      
   32
Table 12. Comparison of Residual Heterogeneity between Catholics and Protestants  
(Standard Deviations of OLS Regression Errors in Unobservable Variables)  
Variable Protestants  Catholics  Difference  Difference  
(in %) 
Trust Church  0.916 0.944  -0.028
*** -3.02% 
Tolerance of tax fraud  0.838 0.901  -0.063
*** -7.48% 
Cover up for friends  0.726 0.874  -0.148
*** -20.44% 
Trust institutions  0.891 0.940  -0.049
*** -5.48% 
Trust strangers  0.692 0.742  -0.050
*** -7.27% 
Importance of family  1.004 1.122  -0.118
*** -11.78% 
Faith  0.698 0.783  -0.085
*** -12.25% 
Religious upbringing  0.814 0.740  0.074
*** 9.07% 
Source of data: ISSP (1998). Notes: Calculated from residuals of regressions of unobservable variables (Trust 
Church, Tolerance of tax fraud, Cover up for friends, Trust institutions, Trust strangers, Faith and Religious 
upbringing) on observable variables (demographic and country controls plus Catholic, Education, Catholic 
* 
Education, Working hours, Positive working hours, Earnings, Volunteer and Religious practice).  
*** Significant at 5 and 1%, using the Levene (1960) robust test for equality of variances. 